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While the evidence accumulates that many countries are fashioning 
aspects of green development to complement their ‘black, fossil-fuelled 
industries, the case for a wholesale adoption of green development 
strategies is seldom made. Instead it is frequently assumed that green 
development can only follow black development, and that it is only for 
countries that have reached a certain income level. In this paper the 
argument is reversed, and the case for a greening of development 
strategies even in the case of the poorest countries, is mounted. The 
advantages that can flow from a greening of development are identi- 
fied and strategies for capturing these advantages, based on notions 
of leapfrogging and capturing latecomer advantages, are developed. 
The case for greening is independent of issues of global warming, but 
the fact that green development strategies combat climate change, and 
ameliorate conditions for the least advantaged, are in their favour.
Keywords: Green development strategy, Green growth, Business 
as usual, Low-carbon trajectory
JEL Classification: O14, O16
I. Introduction
The countries that have achieved wealth today industrialized through 
a common pattern, involving access to energy sources of unprecedented 
power (steam power, then electric power, based on fossil fuels), access 
to resources at unprecedented levels of exploitation (largely through ex- 
ploitation of extra-territorial colonial possessions), and the targeting of 
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finance to facilitate the construction of a vast industrial infrastructure 
(through new industrial banks such as the Deutsche Bank). Latecomers 
such as the East Asian countries of the past half-century (Japan, then 
Korea and Taiwan and Singapore) faced a situation where they could 
deploy the same industrial model but exploiting latecomer advantages, 
developing novel strategies for the building of their own industrial cor- 
porations and accessing export markets through cost-driven mass pro- 
duction capacities. Now in the 21
st century we find industrial giants like 
China, India and Brazil likewise looking to industrialize and bring their 
vast populations up to something comparable to first world standards, 
and looking to that same conventional industrial model as the means to 
do so.
The problem― or inconvenient truth― is that the conventional indus- 
trial model will not ‘scale’ to satisfy the aspirations of these 21
st century 
industrial giants― let alone the aspirations of the many countries in 
Africa, South and Central America, South and Central Asia that are 
looking to upgrade their wealth and income through industrialization. 
The earth’s resources are already overstretched by the actions of the 
‘first’ industrializers, which have led to around 1 billion people enjoying 
a prosperous life style. To bring up to 6 billion people to a middle-class 
lifestyle by mid-century (as foreseen by economists such as Michael 
Spence) would call for a sixfold expansion of these activities, with inten- 
sity multiplied by the accelerated pace of change. China and India are 
both courting disaster, from rising oil prices, increasing vulnerability to 
a handful of oil suppliers and exacerbating tensions with existing in- 
dustrialized countries and their ‘carbon lock-in.’
The answer to this conundrum is not for China and India to turn 
their back on growth and industrial development, but to build a new kind 
of industrial system and a new kind of development pathway. This 
alternative is what is known as the ‘green’ industrial system (green 
growth, green development)― and the current interest of the UN and all 
development-oriented agencies is to ascertain to what extent a green 
industrial system really is being fashioned and implemented in these 
countries, and to what extent it may represent a fresh option for the 
many developing countries coming after them. Such a green development 
strategy is the inevitable choice for China and the BICs because these 
countries can leapfrog to the lead with green technology and because 
they have such huge populations for which the traditional model would 
not scale. Chinese scholars like Hu Angang see such a development as 
the ‘inevitable choice’ for China― and by extension, for the rest of the 
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developing world.1
There has been a stream of recent reports extolling green growth as 
a development strategy as well as a favourable turn by newly-industrialized 
countries such as Korea.2 But the case is generally made in terms of 
the world’s collective interest in green outcomes. In this paper I am 
concerned instead with the benefits that accrue to the individual coun- 
tries that pursue a green development (GD) strategy.3 While the term 
‘green development’ or ‘green growth’ is subject to various interpreta- 
tions, the key ideas are that an industrial system based on something 
other than fossil fuels and extensive resource throughput is being con- 
structed―with small initial steps but always aimed at minimizing the 
fossil-fuelled footprint.4 The goal of such an approach is to build energy 
systems that can increasingly live off their renewable energy income, and 
materials processing industries that tend to minimize virgin resource 
inputs. Both aspects have profound implications for countries’ develop- 
ment prospects.
Two factors are taken into consideration by countries that deem their 
future to be green. The first is that the cost reductions (the learning 
curve, or experience curve) are being driven more rapidly as China enters 
one green business after another―making it easier for emerging de- 
veloping countries (EDCs) to enter these sectors as well. The upfront 
costs are being steadily reduced― as discovered by countries that are 
installing solar PV panels in villages such as in India as a means of 
providing households with electric power prior to being connected to 
the grid. 
The second factor is that EDCs stand to benefit from latecomer ad- 
1 See Spence (2011) and Hu (2006a, 2006, 2011).
2 See recent reports from the UN (2012); UNEP (2011), ADB/UNEP/UNESCAP 
(2012), OECD (2011), WB (2012) and for more theoretical treatment by World Bank 
economists, Hallegatte et al. (2012).
3 See Mathews (2007a, 2007b, 2008) for early statements of this view. Likewise 
the “ecological modernization” perspective has argued that ecological reforms such 
as a shift to renewable energies can carry economic and industrial benefits. See 
Mol and Spaargaren (2009) for a recent overview.
4 Recent contributions to the debate over ‘green growth or ‘green development’ 
express a caution that needs to be added to the more optimistic reports from 
UNDP and other agencies. They include those by Schmalensee (2012), where he 
focuses on the long-term costs of such a strategy with little regard to the bene- 
fits. See van der Ploeg and Withagen (2013), where they note the difficulties of 
launching green growth strategies at a time of economic crisis, and Barbier (2012) 
who notes the failure of the G20 summit in Mexico in late-2012 to pay any more 
than lip-service to policies favouring green growth.
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vantages and can pursue leapfrog strategies.5 These work to these 
countries’ advantage of in general, but in the case of green investments 
there is a decided advantage for EDCs in that the developed countries 
suffer from carbon lock-in, and exhibit a marked reluctance to invest in 
green businesses, even when the technologies are available. But the de- 
veloping countries can take advantage of the underlying trend in techno- 
economic paradigm shifts. 
Indeed a strong case can be made that there have been several such 
techno-economic paradigm shifts since the Industrial Revolution, and 
that latecomers have been able to deploy leapfrog strategies to enter the 
global industrial system as each new shift asserts itself. Thus the most 
recent (the fifth) was getting under way in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
and involved the introduction of microelectronics, integrated circuits and 
information technology (IT), creating space for newcomers to become in- 
volved. Prior to that, there was the rise of mass production and the oil- 
based automotive industry (early 20
th century), and prior to that the third 
such transition (steel, chemicals and electric power), the second (iron, 
steam and railroads) and the first (factory production). Now there could 
well be a peaking of the fifth techno-economic transition and the pos- 
sibility of a secondary surge, lasting from around 2012 to 20120, driven 
by investments in renewable energies and resource efficiency―where 
EDCs can play a leading role while developed countries are having to 
deal with their carbon lock-in problems.6
The best leapfrog strategy of all is to utilize innovative forms of finance 
that tap into the previously untapped institutional investors’ capital mar- 
ket, to finance ‘at scale’ investments in green technology in EDCs. So 
far, investments in green technologies in EDCs have been discussed in 
terms of public finance (derived ultimately from tax revenues)― yet it is 
clear that private sector funding will be needed to reach the scale of bil- 
lions, and trillions of dollars of investments being mentioned by the IEA 
as needed to effect a shift in the global energy regime. The fact is that 
institutional investors are looking for sustainable ways of diversifying 
their portfolios away from carbon-intensive investments (as discussed in 
several recent OECD reports, discussed below), while the best prospects 
5 See the classic paper on leapfrogging by Perez and Soete (1988), and its 
application to the case of renewable energies (Walz 2010).
6 On the successive technoeconomic shifts that have accompanied changing 
industrial drivers, see Mathews (2013) for a recent assessment. Zysman and 
Huberty (2011) likewise argue that green growth will move ‘from religion to reality’ 
only when energy reforms become systemic and pervasive.
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for such investments are to be found in the EDCs. Here is the possi- 
bility of a major match, to be effected by development banks that singly 
and together can issue the required green bonds to channel investments 
at scale to renewable energy and other green projects― bypassing the 
players in the fossil fuel economy that effect and prolong carbon lock- 
in. Here indeed is a powerful way of framing the green development in- 
dustrial policy challenge.
Greening of development strategies needs to be seen in this light―
not as a luxury that few countries can afford, but as a necessity to 
avoid energy insecurity and the potential for disastrous resource wars 
as countries are forced to struggle over access and the fuels become 
more and more insecure in supply. It is smart policies and particularly 
tapping into novel forms of financing that bypass fossil fuel interests 
which hold the key to further development― as may be observed in 
many industrializing countries, and reflected in reports from multilateral 
agencies. This is the starting point for the argument developed in this 
paper.
II. China, India, Brazil: green and black development
China (and India and Brazil) have been taking important initiatives in 
new green growth strategies. China has been building its Renewable 
Energy (RE) industries as fast as it can, and so far with notable suc- 
cess. In wind power, for example, China has risen from a marginal 
position in 2005, doubling its wind power capacity each year, to the 
point that it was world leader in terms of production of wind power 
generators and size of domestic wind power market, by the end of 2010. 
By 2010, China was adding more power generating capacity in hydro, 
nuclear and ‘new’ renewables than in conventional thermal power stations
― an extremely important milestone, for China and for the world. Its 
12
th Five Year Plan has notable goals of raising these levels. In terms of 
electric power, China’s leadership, in the form of the planning body―
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)―anticipates 
that electric power capacity will be rated at 1.6 TW by 2020, and of 
this, 500 GW (0.5 TW) will be generated from renewable sources―
hydro, wind, solar― i.e. renewables accounting for 30% of electric power 
capacity by 2020.7
7 On these targets, see Mathews (2011) and Mathews and Tan (2013). On 
China’s green development strategies, see the chapter on China in Zysman and 
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India is likewise pursuing an advanced renewable energy strategy, 
even as it builds up its black energy supply systems to feed its growing 
manufacturing and industrial might. In August 2011, India’s installed 
electric power capacity stood at 182 GW (compared with China’s 1000 
GW), of which 65% is generated from conventional coal-fired plants, 22% 
from hydroelectric sources, and 3% from nuclear, plus 10% from re- 
newable sources (mostly wind and biomass). India is now going through 
the same kind of intensive expansion of its coal-fired power generation 
system― a ‘black development’ pathway― as China has done for the 
past decade. But in the case of India this black development pathway is 
stalling because of severe problems in getting coal to the users (to be 
discussed in a moment). In such a situation India has everything to gain 
by seeking also to pursue an industrial strategy of building its green 
energy sources as rapidly as possible. This it is doing on all the fronts 
available― solar, wind, bioenergy. Like China, India is developing five- 
year targets for renewable energy development. In 2010 India had in- 
stalled wind power capacity of 14.6 GW (exceeding the 11
th Five-Year 
Plan target of 10.5 GW). In 2009, the government announced an am- 
bitious $19 billion plan to produce 22 GW of solar power by 2022 (i.e. 
by the end of the 13
th FYP), up from 2 GW today― the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Solar Mission. Institutional innovations include the Indian 
Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) as well as a Ministry of 
New and Renewable Energy (MNRE, formerly Ministry of Non-Conventional 
Energy Sources), ensuring that renewables receive maximum political 
and financial support.
India’s problems with getting sufficient power from its chaotic coal 
supplies provide an object lesson in why renewables make sense for all 
developing countries. India’s electric power supplies are endlessly frus- 
trating for businesses, with blackouts and brownouts common, even daily 
occurrences. Vikas Bajaj described in vivid detail what the effects have 
been on India’s economic prospects in an influential article in the New 
York Times in April 2012.8 The result for India has been a loss of 
Huberty (2011).
8 Bajaj described how India’s power problems are bad and getting worse, be- 
cause of the mistakes made in exploiting domestic coal reserves. Annual indus- 
trial growth has diminished to 7% over the past two years largely due to this 
problem. 
The story comments:
India has long struggled to provide enough electricity to light its homes 
and power its industry around the clock. In recent years, the government 
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industrial output―with the growth rate reduced from 10% in 2010 to 
an estimated 7%, largely attributable to losses of power and fuel supplies. 
Plans for coal-fired power stations continue to be promoted, but it would 
make so much more sense for a huge country like India to break this 
‘carbon lock-in’ and go instead for a fresh approach.
The developing country that has managed its ongoing transition to a 
green economy is Brazil, thereby setting a different kind of benchmark 
for other EDCs. Recent government initiatives in Brazil have lifted 40 
million people out of poverty, and the country is focused on green de- 
velopment through the Rio + 20 conference on sustainable development 
envisaged for 2012. Brazil is already a major user of renewable energy 
sources, meeting 85% of its energy needs from renewables, both in the 
form of hydropower in the electric power sector and of biofuels in the 
transport sector. According to Brazil’s 2008 National Energy Balance, 
total electric power capacity was just over 100 GW (around 1/10
th of 
China’s capacity), of which 78 GW was hydropower, 23 GW conven- 
tional coal-fired plants, 2 GW of nuclear and so far only a small 414 
MW (0.4 GW) of wind power. This puts Brazil in a uniquely favourable 
position amongst emerging and developing countries, in that it is less 
exposed to energy insecurity and international pressures―while main- 
taining a strong incentive to build its own energy industries as the core 
of its development strategy. (Brazil’s biofuels programs are described 
below.)9
All these unprecedented investments by China and the BICs in de- 
velopment of green power sources are driving down costs, not just for 
China but for all developing countries. The issue is: can the costs of 
shifting to a renewable energy pathway (as called for in the UN Secretary- 
General’s Sustainable Energy for All program) be moderated so that 
developing countries are enabled to enjoy the advantages of shifting to 
such sources, while not paying a penalty in terms of excess costs and 
reduced competitiveness. Now, data supports the argument that the costs 
of renewables are relentlessly coming down (due to the learning curves) 
and private sector sought to change that by building scores of new power 
plants. But that campaign is now running into difficulties because the 
country cannot get enough fuel―principally coal― to run the plants. Clumsy 
policies, poor management and environmental concerns have hampered the 
country’s efforts to dig up fuel fast enough to keep up with its growing 
need for power. 
See New York Times, 19 April 2012.
9 See Frischtak (2011) for a recent elaboration of Brazil’s GD strategies.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS154
    Source: BNEF Bazilian et al. (2012), Fig. 1.
FIGURE 1
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULE EXPERIENCE CURVE, 1976-2011 
while the costs for fossil fuels can only be expected to rise (driven by 
rising demand from the newly developing countries). This is the factor 
that is going to give latecomers who build their industrial strategies on 
green development a decided advantage. And it is China’s arrival as a 
major industrial power that is driving down the costs of renewables, 
making them accessible to all developing countries. Consider the situation 
for solar photovoltaic power (PV). The Figure 1 reveals that the costs 
for solar PV are falling at 45% per year, and that grid parity will be 
achieved (or is already being achieved) by 2015. 
The data that now need to be considered in framing any development 
strategy are those relating to the falling costs of power produced from 
renewable sources. The Bloomberg/New Energy Finance team in London 
have recently produced a White Paper on ‘Re-considering the economics 
of photovoltaic power’ (Bazilian et al. 2012) where they make some very 
important points. 
In this chart, based on and updating the chart on experience curves 
contained in the recent IPCC report on Renewable Energies (IPCC 2011), 
the overall experience curve is shown in the upper blue line, indicating 
that costs had reduced to the long anticipated point of $1 per watt by 
the end of 2011 and bringing solar photovoltaic (PV) power within the 
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range of almost all emerging and developing countries. The years imme- 
diately preceding this show that costs hovered for several years (2004 
to 2008) at around four times this level ($4/W)― a phenomenon now 
understood to be due to suppliers being able to command feed-in tariff 
rates locked at these levels, while restricted silicon supplies meant that 
there was little price competition. It was this that led many to believe 
that costs of renewable energies would always exceed those of conven- 
tionally fuelled power. But as silicon supplies became more flexible, so 
manufacturers reduced their prices, which in turn reduced input costs 
for solar cell producers, and their prices fell as well. The bottom blue 
line represents the cost curve for thin-film solar cell producers, domin- 
ated by the US firm First Solar. Because TF PV cells utilize much lower 
quantities of silicon their costs have always been lower― but are not 
yet enjoying the economies of scale of amorphous silicon cells (the dom- 
inant technology, where China has excelled). 
The message for developing countries is clear: the costs of solar PV 
cells are falling at around 45% per year. In many EDCs with above- 
average insolation (which means countries right across the tropical belt, 
including the majority of EDCs) this means that producing electric power 
from solar PVs is now cheaper than producing power from, e.g. stand- 
alone diesel generators. Thus the way is opening to the realization of 
the UN Secretary-General’s Renewable Energy for All program.
   
III. Motives for a green development strategy
These considerations compel a reconsideration of development strategy. 
Even less than a decade ago, it was possible for the World Bank and 
other agencies, such as the multilateral banks, the OECD Development 
Centre and journals like World Development to discuss development with 
zero reference to energy or to the negative consequences of dependence 
on fossil fuels (and particularly fossil fuel imports). A ‘business as usual’ 
fossil fuel-based and resource-intensive development pathway was simply 
assumed― it was beyond discussion. Now the situation has changed, 
and it is the result of a ‘perfect storm’ of three inter-related trends or 
issues― that of energy security, economic security and environmental 
security. A ‘business as usual’ (BAU) development pathway now appears 
to be fraught with danger.
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A. Energy insecurity
A BAU development pathway creates severe energy insecurity, as fossil 
fuel imports would become more and more contested, their costs and 
prices rise, and extreme dependence on imports become increasingly 
problematic. Small developing countries such as those in the Caribbean 
(e.g. Jamaica and Trinidad/Tobago) are actually 100% dependent on oil 
imports for their energy―while the islands exist in the midst of natural 
resource abundance. 
B. Economic insecurity
The BAU development pathway creates economic insecurity through 
the inevitability of rising prices for energy and resource inputs, by con- 
trast with the absence of extra costs for the ‘fuel’ involved in tapping of 
renewable resources. Of course the technology for tapping into renewable 
flows of energy, or for recycling resources through industry, is not cost- 
free― but its short-term costs need to be weighed against longer-term 
security.
C. Environmental insecurity
The debates over global warming are just the most pointed of the 
growing awareness of the environmental security created by reliance on 
fossil fuels and high resource throughput development model. It is in 
fact becoming clear that it will be the poorest who suffer most from the 
effects of global warming and climate change―and so there is even more 
incentive for the poorest developing countries to lead the transition to a 
green development pathway.
To these points there need to be added others such as the impossi- 
bility for developing countries today to secure resources through military 
conquest, as was open to the European and North American countries 
in their earlier experiences of industrialization. Thus BAU development 
is simply not available, or generates such extreme insecurities, that an 
alternative has to be found. And such an alternative is being found, as 
China et al. scale up their clean technology GD pathways as fast as, or 
faster, than the conventional fossil-fuelled black development trajectory. 
Which wins is obviously a matter of great importance.
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IV. Reasons for the Efficacy of Green Development 
    Strategies
In addition to avoiding the problems or impossible options created by 
the BAU development pathway, an alternative based on green develop- 
ment offers many advantages to developing countries that look to raise 
their living standards through industrialization and industrial catch-up 
with the West. Assuming that the strategy is directed towards building 
cleantech industries, and not just cleantech markets, we can identify at 
least nine inter-related advantages of moving towards GD pathways. 
A. Renewable Resources are Available to All
A GD pathway will be based on technologies that capture renewable 
flows of energy or reduced resource input requirements, and thus will 
be based sustainably on endlessly renewing resources. These resources 
are abundant―particularly in tropical developing countries―and widely 
dispersed, meaning that countries can frame their strategies without 
regard to accidents of geography. A GD pathway provides a secure and 
sustainable foundation for a development strategy― as opposed to the 
insecurities, costs and foreign dependence associated with the BAU path- 
way. Since the renewable resources are widely dispersed and hence open 
to all, they do not privilege some countries or regions by geographic 
accident. And since the capture of renewable energies and the recycling 
of resources calls for sophisticated technologies, the latecomer pursuing 
them is required to think in terms of development as the building of 
technological capabilities complementing the diffusion of technologies―
rather than just on extracting wealth from quarries, mines or plantations.
B. Green Development is Biased towards Rural Employment 
   Generation
Green development (GD) pathways will bias countries to sustainable 
income generation, employment generation and particularly rural employ- 
ment generation and protection, thus easing the transition from rural 
to urban based manufacturing. Social and economic polarization can there- 
fore be mitigated by GD strategies―while enjoying all the advantages 
of urban, manufacturing-based development. 
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C. Cost Disadvantages can be Overcome
GD pathways incur initial costs which can exceed those associated 
with cheap fossil fuels― but offer medium― and long-term sustainable 
advantages. The short-term costs can be met by smart finance and tax 
relief policies. The medium― to long-term advantages are securely based 
on learning curves that relentlessly reduce costs, as opposed to rising 
costs of fossil fuel and resource inputs. This is a far more advantageous 
development strategy than one based on imports of fossil fuels, no matter 
how cheap they may be in the short term.
D. A GD Pathway Offers Unlimited Catch-up and Technological 
   Leapfrogging Possibilities
Capture of catch-up and leapfrogging opportunities lie at the core of 
all successful development strategies. Whereas the East Asian countries 
such as Korea were able to catch-up in prevailing sectors such as elec- 
tronics, semiconductors and telecommunications, today’s developing giants 
such as China, India and Brazil need to focus on new technological 
sectors, of which renewable energies and industrial ecology (transforming 
one firm’s waste into another’s inputs) will prove to be most capable of 
generating industrial advantages. Brazil provides many examples of in- 
novations underpinning biofuels development (discussed below).
E. Green and Black Development Complement Each Other
A GD pathway offers resource-abundant countries (e.g. most tropical 
developing countries) a sensible and logical path forward by tapping 
initially into their own resources and seeking investment to add value 
to these resources as a first step in successful industrialization. Thus 
countries such as Mozambique, where a long history of terrible civil wars 
delayed development, has over the past decade recovered its economic 
momentum and is actually building on extensive fossil fuel resources to 
create a modern economy peopled by modern firms, generating employ- 
ment and exports. This is done in ‘black economy’ terms. But at the 
same time it is providing a means to finance green development initia- 
tives, including hydroelectric, solar and wind power initiatives, and the 
beginnings of a new front in agriculture devoted to bioenergy and bio- 
fuels.10 These considerations are the very opposite of those underpin- 
10 On Mozambique’s energy choices. See Cuvilas et al. (2010).
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ning the notion of the ‘resource curse’―where development of a mono- 
resource (usually by foreign capital) is allowed to outweigh all other de- 
velopment options.
F. GD Generates Export Earnings and Reduces Import Charges
A GD pathway offers the prospect of generating a double dividend in 
the form of reducing import costs and generating export earnings, while 
building business experience. The generation of export earnings creates 
the funds needed to buy equipment and enter into modern manufacturing 
activities, thus building a wave of development across the economy. The 
reduction and avoidance of costs incurred through fossil fuel imports 
again releases further funds for investment in domestic development, 
and reduces costs for domestic industry which is otherwise made un- 
competitive abroad through high fuel and power charges (not to mention 
power blackouts and brownouts). Green development through circular 
economy initiatives (e.g., recycling and industrial ecology linkages) offer 
the prospect of reduced dependence on resource imports and strains on 
the balance of payments which can drag down countries aspiring to 
middle-income status.
G. A GD Pathway Generates Increasing Returns through 
   Cross-linkages
GD offers numerous and growing possibilities for building cross-linkages 
that generate increasing returns and underpin an economy’s growth. As 
opposed to resource extraction activities, which stand alone with few (if 
any) connections to the domestic economy, the pursuit of renewable 
energy and cleantech industries brings to the fore the construction of 
value chains and their cross-linkages. Policies designed to create domes- 
tic supply chains come to the fore. This generates a renewed emphasis 
on what (in development circles) used to be called the ‘big push’―
meaning that development could be expected to succeed only when sev- 
eral industries providing markets for each other were developed simul- 
taneously.11 Now the same idea can now be translated into green de- 
velopment terms. Criss-crossing value chains constitute the skeleton of 
a successful industrial economy, and a bias towards clean technology 
industries can create the momentum for such wealth-generating link- 
ages.12
11 See Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) for the classic statement of this position.
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H. Insertion in Global Value Chains
A GD pathway offers opportunities for local firms to embed themselves 
in global value chains and to create their own local supply chains― as 
witnessed in the domestic value chains being created in China and 
India for solar cell and wind generator construction, and in Brazil for 
bioethanol and now biodiesel processing. A GD pathway likewise reduces 
the prospect that developing countries will be locked in to a single mono- 
culture (e.g. resource extraction) given that it is technologically based 
rather than extraction based, and offers opportunities for local firms.
I. GD Provides a Bias towards Innovation
Finally, a GD pathway creates a bias towards innovation― rather than 
simply passively accepting and riding on innovations generated elsewhere 
in resource extraction industries. The focus on technology and techno- 
logical capabilities acquisition is just what a developing country needs. 
The bias towards keeping up with renewable technologies as they are 
developed around the world puts the developing country in good com- 
pany― and sets it up for waves of technology diffusion (encouraged 
through public research institutes such as ITRI in Taiwan or EMBRAPA 
in Brazil) that drive the development trajectory, and prevent it from being 
‘stuck’ at any point or level.
These are all potential advantages that are available to latecomers―
provided they develop smart strategies for taking advantage of these 
opportunities, and for getting around the barriers raised by fossil fuel 
dependence and ‘carbon lock-in,’ and are prepared to invest resources 
in their own development of technical capabilities and innovation. And 
they are available to countries at all levels of development― from the 
poorest and least-developed (provided they have state institutions that 
can act to shunt the economy onto a green trajectory) to those at mid- 
level where aspirations to become integrated in global value chains are 
strongest.
Take the case of Brazil and its very successful biofuel programs as 
an illustration how developing countries can capture latecomer advan- 
12 I say ‘can create’ rather than ‘does create’ because obviously the cross- 
linkage advantages are secured only by smart policies that seek to create such 
linkages; in the absence of such policies, critiques such as those by Resnick et 
al. (2012) carry weight.
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tages in renewables. Brazil is a developing country that has not faced 
the problem of fossil fuel dependence. It has been able to build an elec- 
tric power system based largely on hydropower (which is still being ex- 
tended, controversially, as witnessed by the latest loans from the BNDeS 
to the Belo Monte dam); an urban private transport system based largely 
on home-grown and processed ethanol and (now) biodiesel; and thanks 
to oil discoveries an export platform for oil and gas that earns export rev- 
enues for development across the economy. In these ways Brazil stands 
as a model for all tropical developing countries― particularly those in 
Africa like Angola and Mozambique that also have oil, gas and coal de- 
posits and abundant solar and water resources. 
Brazil developed its bioethanol program through utilizing its own do- 
mestic resources (sugar cane plantations fed by rainfall without the need 
for irrigation) and technology. Through the National Alcohol Program, 
dating back to the military dictatorship in the 1970s, a market for ethanol 
was mandated as a means of saving oil imports. Domestic producers were 
encouraged as well as local suppliers of equipment (such as Dedini) 
thus creating an entire value chain on the supply side. On the demand 
side there was initial resistance because cars had to be either ethanol- 
adapted or conventional, and consumers that switched to ethanol-only 
vehicles in the 1980s were then burned as the global price of oil fell 
and ethanol became non-competitive. But in the 2000s Brazil’s ethanol 
program was revived with the strong support of the government, of the 
national oil company Petrobras, and with the demand-side innovation 
(developed in Brazil) of flex-fuel vehicles, which could run on ethanol, 
gasoline or any combination of the two. The rapid rate of penetration of 
flex-fuel vehicles into the Brazilian automotive sector, since their intro- 
duction in 2003, is revealed in Figure 2.
　The success of the Brazilian bioethanol program (now being replicated 
in the case of biodiesel) is not a conventional story of import of product, 
followed by import of equipment and insertion in global value chains in 
order to access technology. Rather, Brazil was already a sugar producer 
at the world frontier in terms of technology and world leader in terms of 
costs―and was able to carry these initial advantages across to the pro- 
duction of ethanol. Technology for ethanol production was initially im- 
ported and rapidly domesticated (leading to formation of domestic equip- 
ment suppliers such as Dedini) and then diffused rapidly through the 
R&D efforts of the national R&D institution, EMBRAPA. This was the 
body (equivalent to ITRI in Taiwan) that maintained a technological watch 
on global developments, and utilized advanced technological methods for 
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researching Brazil’s sources of comparative advantage, e.g. soils suitable 
for sugar cane cultivation as revealed by satellite surveillance. But these 
advantages inherent in Brazil’s situation would have been reduced to 
naught had it not been for strong government support in mandating a 
steadily increasing market share for domestically produced ethanol, and 
the role of the national oil company Petrobras in acting as primary dis- 
tributor of ethanol through pipelines and terminals and fuel outlets 
across the country. Now Brazil is building an entire value chain for 
production of first-generation ethanol as well as creating companies to 
usher in the second generation (in competition as well as collaboration 
with US and European firms). It bears repeating that its success would 
be all the greater had a free market for biofuels been allowed to de- 
velop. To create such a global free market remains a primary diplomatic 
goal of Brazil in international forums.    
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V. Barriers Blocking the Application of Green Development 
   Strategies
The barriers standing in the way of countries adopting a GD path- 
way, with all its advantages, are numerous. The principal barriers are 
costs, trade barriers, technological barriers, difficulties in raising finance, 
and the most difficult of all― the intangible barriers known as ‘carbon 
lock-in’ (Unruh 2002). 
A. Short-term Cost Barriers
The most immediate barrier is that posed by the cost disadvantage―
even when costs are falling rapidly, as in the case of solar PV systems. 
Short-term cost barriers can be overcome through smart strategies―
concentrating initially on renewable energy technologies which are closest 
to grid parity (onshore wind and solar PV) while keeping abreast of 
those technologies that are coming within reach of grid parity such as 
solar thermal power and offshore wind. Smart financing arrangements 
such as climate bonds (particularly if issued by green banks) enable 
projects to be aggregated so that economies of scale can be captured, 
further driving down costs. Smart tax arrangements such as a value- 
added tax that is recouped by projects with domestic content (technical- 
ly outside the ambit of the WTO but one that can be argued― following 
the example of China), the withdrawal of historic subsidies on fossil 
fuels and the creation of short-term and diminishing subsidies on re- 
newables (such as feed-in tariffs) all help to reduce the gap between 
renewable options and their least-cost fossil fuel alternatives.
B. Trade barriers
The free trade that has been allowed to underpin the success of the 
global fossil fuels industries has rarely been transferred across to alter- 
native fuels and renewable energies. In extreme cases, there are tariff 
barriers that directly impede exports from developing countries― such 
as the import tariff and production tax credit paid in the US to Iowa 
corn farmers and ethanol producers until the expiry of the trade barriers 
in 2012 (after many years campaigning by Brazil ). The tariff barriers 
blocking exports from developing countries to the EU remain in place. 
Meanwhile a global free market in clean technologies, which would help 
developing countries looking to import such technologies and eventually 
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exporting the clean products made with such technologies, is now seen 
as a feasible option― given the first steps that have been taken by the 
Asia-Pacific Economic (APEC) countries with the commitment to reduce 
tariffs on ‘environmental goods’ to below 5% by 2015― taken at the 
Vladivostok summit of APEC in September 2012. 
C. Technological Barriers
All development strategies turn on the issue of how to secure access 
to advanced technologies―whether through foreign direct investment 
involving multinationals, or insertion in global value chains, or through 
purchase of equipment. The most sophisticated strategy of all is to secure 
access to technologies via licensing, through payment of royalties to pa- 
tent holders. But this is hardly a strategy open to most middle-ranking 
developing countries, and is certainly beyond the capacities of the poorest 
countries. But every country can follow the lead of Korea or Taiwan in 
their creation of public research institutes (which would be better label- 
led as knowledge diffusion institutes)― such as ITRI in Taiwan or KIET 
in Korea. In the 21
st century we now see Taiwan promoting its solar PV 
industry actively through the same kind of technology diffusion man- 
agement strategies, involving ITRI in building technical capabilities to 
be passed across to the private sector, and through building of patent 
pools (Mathews, Hu, and Wu 2011). Such strategies are open to emula- 
tion by all developing countries.
D. Finance
Finance and capital flows remain the biggest barriers to successful 
implementation of GD strategies by low-income countries. The efforts by 
Mozambique to create green sectors to complement its development of 
black, fossil-fuelled sectors, is clearly hampered by insufficient capital 
and lack of easy access to finance― even from multilateral banks such 
as the DBSA. While the Kyoto process wrangles over the funding of a 
Climate Fund of public monies, the far greater resources of the public 
and institutional investors (pension funds, insurance and hedge funds) 
which together manage in excess of $71 trillion, remain largely un- 
tapped. Yet it is abundantly clear that the switch to clean technologies 
will only occur once private sector finance is mobilized and convinced of 
the possibility of favourable returns to be generated by renewable energy 
and resource recycling industries. 
The OECD has addressed the issue of green financing and the role 
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that institutional investors from the private sector might play, in a spate 
of recent reports. In the report Towards Green Growth (OECD 2011), a 
review of financing efforts targeted at promoting green growth concluded 
that funds expended so far (around $11 billion) were simply a ‘drop in 
the bucket’ compared with the ‘hundreds of billions that would be need- 
ed’. The report pointed to the capital markets controlled by institutional 
investors and the need for ‘green bonds’ that would appeal to such a 
market. The OECD issued a second report in 2011, specifically on the 
role played by institutional investors, where green bonds were again 
endorsed as a means of channelling large sums to the green economy 
sectors.13 The point of financing such green initiatives from the bond 
markets is that issuing banks can package a portfolio of projects into a 
bond at the scale required to attract serious private investors such as 
pension funds and insurance companies (institutional investors). Until 
such scaling, or aggregation, is accomplished, the financing of green ini- 
tiatives― particularly those being developed in the poorest countries―
will remain at a substandard level, and fail to tap into the vast sums 
that are in reality available.
Perhaps the strongest statement from the OECD in favour of target- 
ing the bond markets and institutional investors to drive investments in 
green infrastructure, in both developed and developing countries, is found 
in the working paper issued by the Finance, Insurance and Private 
Pensions Department in August 2012 (Kaminker and Stewart 2012). 
Here the scale of investment in renewables in the decade 2010 to 2020 
is estimated at $6.3 trillion (i.e. well beyond anything envisaged through 
public funds), while the size of the potential investment pool is defini- 
tively estimated at $71.1 trillion in 2010, and growing rapidly, drawing 
from investment funds, insurance companies and pension funds (Fig. 
3). In this paper sustained attention is given to the barriers standing in 
the way of the deployment of such funds at scale in accelerating the 
uptake of renewable energies and clean technologies around the world.
So a big ‘policy issue’ to be confronted in developing countries as they 
grapple with green growth matters is how to fashion their projects in 
such a way that they will scale up and attract interest from large in- 
stitutional investors, who will provide the key to low-cost funding―
13 In the 2011 report the role of pension funds in investing in new vehicles or 
instruments targeted at green projects was canvassed (Della Croce, R., Kaminker, 
C., and Stewart, F. 2011). On the general issues involved, see Mathews and 
Kidney (2010, 2012)
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 Source: Kaminker and Stewart (2012), Fig. 2
FIGURE 3
INVESTMENT POOL MADE UP OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 1995-2010
bringing the renewable energy projects within the reach of even the 
poorest countries. As the Della Croce report notes, such initiatives have 
to be taken with the greatest caution, and with the full support of exist- 
ing development banks, multilateral development banks, and multilateral 
insurance agencies such as the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) of the World Bank.
E. Industrial Inertia ― Carbon Lock-in
The biggest barrier of all is that posed by the accumulated infrastruc- 
ture, practices, policies and standards that favour the fossil-fuelled in- 
dustrial sectors― the complex of issues that has aptly been called ‘carbon 
lock-in’ (Unruh 2002). Without active intervention by strong, policy-guided 
government ministries, the industrial infrastructure (hard and soft) of 
the fossil-fuel system will prevail. Without active intervention to break 
such locked-in structures and processes, it will be impossible to move 
to a new, green development trajectory. This is why favored policies 
such as carbon taxes and carbon markets (e.g. cap and trade schemes) 
are illusory; for most developing countries they would have zero impact. 
(Think of Mozambique with minimal heavy industrial activities other 
than fossil fuel extraction and export―what use is a carbon tax in such 
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a situation?) In such situations it is determined government intervention 
to set new norms, standards and market penetration levels―as actively 
practised by China with its 12th Five Year Plan and accompanying re- 
gulations; by Brazil with its market norms for adoption of biofuels; and 
India with its market norms under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 
Mission.
It is strategy, as developed and implemented by a strong state guid- 
ing hand, that enables countries to surmount/evade these barriers and 
reap the potential advantages associated with green development.14 No- 
body hands countries development achievements on a plate― despite 
the evidence of countless aid agencies claiming to do so. What they are 
in fact doing is perpetuating dependence―whereas real development is 
about industrial restructuring and devising ways for a country to build 
industries that are inserted in global value chains and are part of the 
global economy. 
Thus Brazil’s biofuels strategy has been to build a domestic resource 
base and value chain for every aspect of biofuels processing, including 
provision of adequate distribution capacities through mobilizing the ser- 
vices of the country’s national oil company, Petrobras. Further attention 
is now being paid to building of infrastructure (such as pipeline devel- 
opments) to accommodate the anticipated expansion in the country’s 
biofuels industry with the creation of an American hemispheric free 
market in biofuels.
VI. The Case Against a Green Development Strategy
Finally, what are the arguments against such a well-conceived GD 
strategy? Resnick et al. (2012) can be taken as typical. They claim that 
GG strategies can be simply ‘flavor of the month’ and offer superficial 
advantages, which are outweighed by longer-term costs, particularly in 
terms of burdens for the poor. That might be the case for poorly de- 
signed and poorly executed strategies― but claims can be made against 
such poorly administered policies, whatever philosophy they are based 
on.
Resnick et al. argue that, whatever the rhetoric, GD strategies generally 
reduce solely to a strategy for reducing carbon emissions―mainly to 
the benefit of the countries which created the problem in the first place. 
14 This is a point of view that economists rarely agree with. For a clear state- 
ment of the economist’s views with regard to green development, see Lee (2012).
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It is difficult to sustain this argument in the face of China’s GD strategy, 
which is quite clearly oriented towards building a new industrial system 
based on clean technologies alongside of, and gradually replacing, the 
black energy system that has provided the motive power for China’s in- 
dustrial revolution to date. Low carbon emissions are the fortunate (very 
fortunate!) side-effect of this national development strategy. And the same 
argument can be mounted for the strategies being pursued by India 
and Brazil, albeit following China’s lead with a decade or so lag. So the 
GD strategy as outlined above is to be judged not on whether it reduces 
carbon emissions (which it should do, as a side-effect) but on whether 
it enhances a country’s development potential. 
Secondly, Resnick et al. argue that the medium-term effect of pur- 
suing GD strategies single-mindedly is indistinguishable from earlier 
experiences with ‘structural adjustment’ strategies, imposed by the IMF, 
in that they are both concerned with superficial changes to industrial 
structures and less with development potential. Again this may well be 
true of corporate rhetoric calling for more favourable investment treat- 
ment of multinationals (as in South Africa’s minerals sector) but it is 
hardly an adequate description of the fundamental restructuring and 
aspirations to build export platforms for the future associated with the 
green development strategies pursued by China, India and Brazil, and 
evident in the green growth strategies pursued by Korea.15 The argu- 
ment of this paper is that GD strategies need to be judged in terms of 
their strong-willed implementation and not on their weakest examples.
VII. Concluding remarks
In this paper I have argued that China is the game-changer that has 
raised the profile of green development from a curiosity (of interest at 
the margins) to a world-competitive new industry capable of powering a 
giant economy along a development trajectory that will ‘scale’ to the 
needed dimensions, without costing the earth. The green development 
model that China is fashioning, which is already being emulated in some 
ways by Brazil and India, offers the best hope for sustainable develop- 
ment to the next wave of countries following the BICs, including devel- 
oping countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. It is 
China, the pragmatic super-power, that is also developing its black, coal- 
15 On Korea’s green growth strategies, see Mathews (2012) and the OECD 
reports by Jones and Yoo (2011) and by Kang et al. (2012).
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fired energy system as fast as its development of renewables. This would 
make for a pessimistic assessment, were it not for the fact that green 
industries are self-sustaining and grow through logistic (S-shaped) in- 
dustrial dynamics, in a circular and cumulative fashion? while resource 
pressures and rising costs spell an early end for industries built on 
fossil fuels. There is of course no guarantee that China and the BICs 
and then other developing countries can swing fast enough behind such a 
green development model in time to keep carbon emissions and resource 
spoliation within acceptable limits.
The debate amongst EDCs and their representatives has focused on 
whether EDCs need ‘green growth’ and whether it is likely to become 
yet another ‘gimmick’. But the achievements in countries like China, 
Korea, India, Brazil and now diffusing to many other EDCs as well 
stand as testimony to the fact that countries can actually improve their 
development prospects by building green industries. The real issue is to 
overcome pessimism by returning to the roots of what is meant by 
‘development’ as a restructuring of industry and the creation of new 
industries that did not previously exist. These industries can be green 
or they can be black. This paper has argued that EDCs have everything 
to gain by building new industries that enhance their economic pro- 
spects while contributing to a green agenda, and everything to lose by 
continuing to foster the black development pathway that reinforces 
carbon lock-in.
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